

## **Action Plans, Declarations and Other Agenda Setting Documents in International Development Interventions: An Indicator to Assure Professionalism**

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### **Abstract**

*This article offers an easy-to-use indicator to measure whether “action plans”, international declarations, “master plans”, “country plans”, “country strategies”, “legal frameworks”, and other documents commonly generated in international “aid” interventions meet professional and development standards for truly self-activating, feasible plans in compliance with international law and objectives. Use of this indicator suggests that most of the plans and international declarations that are said to be supported by “developing” countries are created by donors as a means of promoting their own agendas, public relations, and fundraising strategies, with plans that are little indication of “action” or “commitment” or, alternatively, that are designed to be effective but are not in compliance with international law and objectives and are more likely to be an abuse of processes and a corruption of professionalism on both sides. The indicator can be used as an accountability tool to spot and counter these abuses. The piece uses the U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions as a case study.*

**Keywords:** Planning, Development, Aid, Globalization, management, United Nations declarations, implementation, strategy, international law

### **Aktionspläne, Deklarationen und andere Agenda-Setting-Dokumente internationaler Entwicklungsinterventionen: Ein Messinstrument zur Sicherstellung von Professionalität**

### **Zusammenfassung**

*Dieser Artikel entwickelt ein einfach anwendbares Messinstrument um zu evaluieren, ob „Aktionspläne“, internationale Deklarationen, „Masterpläne“, „Länderpläne“, „Länderstrategien“, „Rechtsrahmen“ und andere Dokumente, die üblicherweise im Kontext internationaler „Hilfs“-Interventionen erstellt werden, professionelle Entwicklungsstandards für tatsächlich selbst-aktivierende, durchführbare Pläne in Übereinstimmung mit internationalem Recht und Zielen erfüllen. Die Nutzung des Messinstruments legt nahe, dass die meisten von „Entwicklungs“-Ländern unterstützten Pläne und internationalen Deklarationen von Geldgebern als Mittel zur Förderung eigener Ziele, PR und Fundraising-Strategien entwickelt werden, deren Pläne entweder wenig Aktivitäten oder Commitment aufweisen oder so gestaltet sind, dass sie zwar effektiv, aber nicht in Übereinstimmung mit internationalem Recht und Zielen sind und deren Prozesse deshalb anfälliger für Missbrauch sowie Korruption auf beiden Seiten sind. Das Messinstrument kann eingesetzt werden, um solche Missbräuche zu identifizieren und gegenzusteuern. Der Beitrag nutzt dafür die UN-Deklaration gegen Korruption und Bestechung in Internationalen Handelstransaktionen als eine Fallstudie.*

**Schlagwörter:** Planung, Entwicklung, Hilfe, Globalisierung, Management, UN Deklarationen, Implementation, Strategie, internationales Recht

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## 1. Introduction

Visit an international development agency donor organization library and you can peruse volumes of “action plans” that seem to rest in a graveyard of inaction. Alongside them are similar documents announcing “declarations” or “conventions” with unrealized commitments of priorities, enforcement or spending. Given their numbers, it is as if entire industries have sprung up to generate these documents, with little attention to whether they will actually work. Sometimes, they are repeated over and over again in new documents, barely recognizing why the earlier ones were inert.

Many of these are well known.

- At the international level, for example, despite the establishment of a basic international Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948) that almost every country has signed and that dates back more than 60 years, estimates are that some 25 % of the world’s linguistic-cultural groups has become extinct (see Lempert 2010).

- The Rio +20 meetings in 2012, to re-evaluate 20 years of inaction and disregard for sustainable development agreements dating to the 1992 Rio Declaration (see Lempert/Nguyen 2013), also highlighted the question as to whether international declarations and commitments to the globe had any meaning or were simply window dressing.

- The problem is so pervasive that even the international donors’ private commitments to each other for coordination of aid, the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, calling for “country ownership” and “results” seems to be another “action” document that is slated for inaction because of its inability to follow any of the actual principles of an “action” document (see AAA 2008).

Indeed, in the business of international “aid” and “development” interventions one encounters a variety of policy documents at all levels, from international agreements to purported national government documents claimed to be authored, approved and signs of commitment by and from almost every government body. These create the framework for international interventions by introducing international agendas under the names of “action plans”, international declarations, “master plans”, “country plans”, “country strategies”, “legal frameworks” and various other formats.

In many cases, they appear to be “menus that will never be cooked” with actions that are illusory wish lists. In some cases, they may be symbolic, public

service gimmicks to agendas that are designed to be stillborn. In other cases, they may be backroom agreements with government elites to open the door to violations of public rights and international laws presented under the pretext of “sovereign” “government” “public” agendas. Almost all are presented as approved by government bodies and even claimed to be initiated by them or the public, but the reality is that they are usually funded and written by foreigners under foreign funding in the name of local government “sovereignty” and beneficiary interests.

Whatever the reason for the undermining of their purpose, these documents suggest a failure if not a corruption of their stated goals, presented in the guise of actions that are not really actions and of strategies that are not really sovereign. All of them claim to be professional practice documents that presume certain professional standards either in business organizations or in accountable democratic public administration in the context of international development and many fail out of either professional incompetence or by design.

Meanwhile, and almost paradoxically, one finds that several donors and implementing agencies are now improving their measures and assuring that some of their agendas really are action-oriented, results-based, and followed by effective implementation, particularly in the area of investment finance and transfer of technology (see Raffer/Singer 1996). Yet, it is these activities that are often in violation of international treaty objectives for “development”, “sustainable development” and various rights protections that are at the basis of the international system.

The purpose of this article is to clarify the requirements for these professional documents and agreements in a way that can hold their authors and funders accountable to professional and public law standards. Given that these documents appear in the name of beneficiary publics who usually have little or no power to enforce accountability, and given that they are the basis of foreign interventions for good or for ill, some mechanism is necessary to help the international publics in both the intervening and the recipient countries to easily oversee these works undertaken in their name and to enforce accountability.

Previously, this author has offered several indicators to measure whether international donors are meeting their obligations in international law and to professional standards in several of the most basic areas of “development” including meeting the international law definitions and obligations of “development” itself

(see Lempert 2014a, forthcoming) and “sustainable development” (see Lempert/Nguyen 2008), along with legal requirements of “sovereignty/freedom from dependency” (see Lempert 2009a), “democracy” (see Lempert 2011), and “gender equity”, as well as “poverty reduction” (see Lempert 2014b, forthcoming), as part of an effort to establish accountability where little or none exists. The goal has been to create the equivalent of a codification or “treatise” of international development law where no such treatise now exists, so that international organizations, donors, governments of recipient countries and various non-governmental and governmental implementing agents can be held accountable under international law. These indicators combine international law requirements for dealings between countries and professional legal requirements for those engaging in interventions with public and private monies (e. g., legal requirements of “evaluations” (see Lempert 2009b) with professional standards for efficacy and efficiency, in the form of an oversight tool that can be used to create accountability. These indicators measure compliance with international treaty agreements and professional standards while also offering scholars tools they can use for scientific measurement.

This article offers an indicator that combines the legal requirements of treaty compliance in international “development” and international relations with the professional requirements for assuring the efficacy and efficiency of public spending in the area of implementing those interventions. This indicator focuses on agenda setting in public sector activities and complements a previous indicator offered by the author to test the legality, efficacy and efficiency of interventions with the private sector (see Lempert 2012). In focusing on agenda setting and planning, this indicator also supplements another indicator addressing public interventions in the area of “capacity building”; an area of intervention that often precedes and follows agenda setting. A future article that summarizes this series of indicators will offer an additional related indicator that can be used at the design stage of public interventions along with model revisions of some of the basic intervention tools (logical frameworks) and approaches (problem identification) that have been corrupted or discarded in the monitoring of implementation.

The piece begins with a discussion of the professional principles of strategic planning, management control and agenda setting that underlie the quality and effectiveness of the agenda setting documents used in international development interventions. The article

then describes the lack of accountability indicators and the consequences that result from the lack of such oversight in international interventions. The piece then presents an accountability indicator that can be used for such oversight (on “action plans”, international declarations, “master plans”, “country plans”, “country strategies”, “legal frameworks”, and other documents commonly generated in international “aid” interventions), tests it on several organizations and approaches and demonstrates in detail how it can be applied, using the U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions as a case study.

Use of this indicator suggests that most of the plans and international declarations that are said to be supported by “developing” countries are created by donors as a means of promoting their own agendas, public relations, and fundraising strategies, with plans that are little indication of “action” or “commitment” or, alternatively, that are designed to be effective but are not in compliance with international law and objectives and are more likely to be an abuse of processes and a corruption of professionalism on both sides. The indicator can be used as an accountability tool to spot and counter these abuses.

Many of the practical observations in this piece draw from the experience of the author as a practitioner in development for 30 years, who has been called on to draft, troubleshoot and implement these declarations, plans, legal frameworks, and action plans.

## 2. Principles of Strategic Planning, Management Control and Agenda Setting

The principles of strategic planning, management control and agenda setting in the private and public sectors have long been standardized to assure for efficacy and efficiency. At the same time, while there are international laws and treaties that can be (but are not) used for screening and testing compliance of international interventions with the goals of the international system for peace, security, cultural protections, and rights, there are effectively no agreements regulating the procedures for international interventions. It is ironic that while there are two recent international treaties that guide international interventions and reference the idea of standards – the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), now followed and reinforced by the International Aid Transparency Initiative signed in Busan (2011) – they offer few specifics and little enforcement, thus

reflecting the exact problems they claim they are trying to solve. Given that there are professional standards on processes that can be (but are not) linked to the international goals of intervention and on the goals of intervention, itself, it is relatively easy to list the principles in these two categories to use as a guidelines for overseeing interventions.

### 2.1 Principles of Administrative Feasibility and Professionalism

The principles that apply to feasibility and effectiveness of interventions can be found in several texts including those on basic business analysis and organizational strategy for effective management control (see Garrison et al. 2005; Emmanuel et al. 1999), applications for public administration for legal documents and interventions (see Seidman 2000), strategic management and planning in non-governmental organizations (see Barry 1984; Bryson 1988; Unterman/Davis 1984), and overall incentives and psychology of organizational behavior (see Nelson/Quick 2005; Robbins 2002).

There are seven basic elements that apply to behaviors of those undertaking interventions and to those organizations with which they set these agendas. These elements are relatively simple to state and recognize. They include:

- *Feasibility*, such that the organization being tasked already has the existing vision/mission/functions (role) to achieve the outcomes;
- *Incentives*, such that implementing actors have incentives to promote those goals and that the intended approach will be internalized/institutionalized in the organization;
- *Capacity* (financial and technical), such that actors have capacity to promote the goals through the ability to use or shift existing resources;
- *Detailed analysis*, such that there is understanding and research of problem and behaviors that need to be changed to achieve the goal;
- *Clarity of implementation*, such that the goals and measures for carrying them out are clear and there is an appropriate evaluation system for feedback and oversight at all levels to assure efficient results (see Lempert 2009b);
- *Consistency and prioritization*, such that actions that are integrated and cannot be manipulated; and
- *Accountability*, with direct responsiveness to beneficiaries through a rights-based strategy.

Some experts might add other factors to assure that the “best” approaches are undertaken and that approaches are really strategic, but these depend on the goals and on specific technical measures. The list, above, simply asks whether all of the basics are in place so that such technical expertise can function.

### 2.2 Principles of Compliance with Key International Protection and Development Objectives

To meet the requirements of international law, development interventions must comply with international legal agreements and further the established objectives in the area of “development”, including “sustainability” and autonomy which are the essence for achieving the ultimate goals of the international system; protection and survival of distinct groups and humanity. Whether interventions comply with specific development objective and treaties can be more complex to test than some of the administrative principles. That is why this author has designed other indicators to test them. However, the international legal requirements for “development” and related interventions are easy to list. Five basic elements apply.

Development interventions must satisfy three requirements in order to comply with international law and the goals of the international system: sustainability; development or poverty reduction consistent with sustainability; and protection of sovereignty. At the same time, there are internationally recognized legal standards in professional and technical areas that interventions must satisfy, as well as an overall requirement that interventions not compromise the systems and institutions they claim to be supporting. For easy reference, these requirements can be written as follows:

- *Sustainability/sustainable development*, consistent with the balance of consumption and production over generations for the area of the intervention, with or without growth;
- *Development and/or poverty reduction*, consistent with sustainability. Development and poverty reduction are distinct objectives though they are often confused with each other. The international community in its basic treaty documents defines “development” as full expression of multiple capacities of both cultures and individuals in their diversity and within their values and choices (see Lempert 2012, unpublished: 1) while it defines long-term poverty reduction as an approach that assures equity and addresses the

real root causes of both absolute and relative poverty (see Lempert 2014b);

- *Sovereignty/cultural integrity and prevention of dependency*, to ensure that cultural identity and autonomy of cultures are safeguarded, such that the driving force of actions comes from the cultural groups themselves and protects their integrity, rather than serves foreign interests;

- *Legal and Professional compliance*, to ensure conformity with basic international treaties and professionalism. Where there are technical activities, they should meet international legal and professional standards within their technical sphere (e. g., democratization, gender equity) with fully professional use of those tools and methods that are suggested (e. g., capacity building that sustainably resolves root cause problems of capacity rather than treats the symptoms or manipulates/purchases actors; evaluation systems that prevent conflicts of interest); and

- *Safeguarding of appropriate mission/functions* of the organization that is the target of intervention, such that there are no possibilities of distortion of missions and functions that could erode the roles of different parts of accountable, responsive government, functioning economic systems, and culturally appropriate civil society.

### 3. Indicators in the Field and the Lack of an Indicator to Screen “Action Plan” Interventions

At present, there are no existing indicators to measure and assure the adherence to the above principles of professionalism in “action plans”, international declarations, “master plans”, “country plans”, “country strategies”, “legal frameworks”, and other documents commonly generated in international “aid” interventions. Indeed, the very declarations that the international community claims to promote such professionalism – the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda (2008) – are examples of the very problems they claim to be addressing.

The Paris Declaration is an example of a “recipe that will never be cooked” because it is addressed to parties that lack the power or incentives to use it, lacks clarity of what it really seeks to achieve, provides no analysis of how it would meet specific needs, and meets none of the actual standards for development interventions. It is simply a list of five principles with each principle based on assumptions that have little to do with the reality.

- The first principle, calling for countries to exercise “ownership” and “effective leadership” over their “development” policies assumes that weak countries are in a real position to protect themselves from outside pressures and that they have real incentives to and even understand the keys of “development”.

- The second and third principles assume that donors have an incentive to align with each other and to harmonize their actions to be transparent.

- The fourth principle of managing for “results” offers no agreement on or measures of those results.

- The fifth principle of mutual accountability is equally fanciful, given that most donors are hardly accountable or transparent either to their own citizens or to recipient countries (see Lempert 2008; 2009b) while the leaders in weak countries are also rarely subject to effective citizen oversight. Donors certainly have the authority to exercise controls and conditionality over recipients, but neither the recipient governments nor their publics have any real power to hold the donors accountable to either their promises or international (or local) law given the asymmetry of power. Moreover, neither country elites nor donor elites seem to have any real incentive to change.

The failure of the Paris Declaration is precisely the reason why it was restated in almost exactly the same terms, three years later, in the Accra Agenda that fancifully calls for “full participation” of all “partners” (but not beneficiaries) and “real and measurable impact” yet fails to reference any goals or measures or consistency with international laws and rights. At the same time, it promotes “capacity development” to build the “sovereignty” that most current donor projects actually work to undermine (see Lempert 2009).

In international development interventions that are “for the people” (of weak and vulnerable cultures and countries), “of their governments” (systems of military and police control with foreign arms but usually little accountability to their peoples), “and by the donors” (often with full control but claims of powerlessness), there is little or no accountability or professionalism. Not only is there no accountability to international law but these imbalances and the skewed incentives of the different players present the clear danger that the very tools and professional standards that are applied fully lose their integrity and are degraded in the context of development, both in the content of “development” projects and in the very form of the management tools and practices that are introduced (see Lempert 2008).

#### 4. What Goes Wrong without Accountability in Agenda Setting

Though there seem to be few studies focusing on the failures of the specific agenda setting mechanisms or the related implementation tools in “development” interventions, it is easy for practitioners to observe the failures and to recognize how they reflect larger failures of “development” intervention. Concrete examples highlight the problem and suggest how agenda setting mechanisms and related implementation tools might be forms of abuse and cover-up of such abuses.

##### 4.1 General Criticism

Critiques of development interventions have often revealed how the stated purpose of these interventions was often directly contradicted in practice. Former World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz, for example, revealed how the goal in international bank loans for “development” was actually to hook countries on borrowing funds that they would be unable to repay, thus making them vulnerable to political pressures to loot their resources and transfer control over their economies and political systems to the “donors” (see Stiglitz 2002). Other critics have similarly noted a pattern of how elites in the donor countries seek to create vulnerability and then take advantage, with Naomi Klein referring to it as the “shock doctrine” (see Klein 2007). Several previous scholars have defined the relationship between “donor” and recipient countries as one of unequal power that invites abuse and dependency (see Wallerstein 1979).

##### 4.2 Vignettes

In a recent project, evaluating child labor protections in Viet Nam for the International Labor Organization (ILO) and U.S. Department of Labor, I made an interesting discovery by doing some outside research on my own time and expense. I found that almost the same projects had been run before, not just once and not just recently but starting nearly five decades earlier (1959-64) (see Hickey 1964) if not several more times subsequently with changing governments. Today, such projects would be called “zombie projects”. No matter how many times they failed or were corrupted, they would be run over and over again, continually praised in evaluation documents as successes to which there was a “commitment” (see Lempert 2009b). Project

documents recorded nothing of the history though the earlier projects were documented in a scholar’s book, that had been disregarded, on life in the areas where projects were being run. My evaluation was also buried. In fact, it was stopped before completion on grounds that the methodologies I was using were “inappropriate”.

Indeed, my experience in 30 years of development projects is that not only are there no attempts (nor compensation) for reviewing the real history, impacts, benchmarks, and failures of previous projects. In most cases, there are incentives to hide them through confidentiality agreements and destruction of those reports that are not viewed as useful for advertising purposes for seeking additional funds to prolong them or run them again.

Recently, on a new project in a neighboring country, for which research had been complete and action was ready to be undertaken by one of several Ministries and government bodies, the response of government officials was to ask for money simply to “do a feasibility study” through which they would draw funds and probably money for “capacity building” and “study tours” that would enrich them with no real action or commitment.

An all too typical project supported by donors is exemplified by one I was asked to join that was funded by the European Commission (EC) in Eastern Europe. The EC had set up a body, supposedly for human rights, that it had bestowed with funds, and had sent a previous consultant to write up the “action plan”. The government, however, refused to fund or to empower the agency to carry out its mission in promoting rights. Rather than focus on the problem, the EC determined that it would hire consultants to further “capacity build” the very agency that had no funds or power. The approach was a bit like hiring a maid for a home whose owner refused to provide the maid with a key and then announcing that the problem could be solved by offering additional training for the maid.

##### 4.3 The Deep Structure of How it Works

Though “action plans”, signed treaties, “legal frameworks” and “declarations” and similar documents are almost always touted by donor organizations as evidence of “government commitment” (and one that also can be used to prevent considering other approaches that could be more effective), the reality is that these commitments are almost always generated by the funds and with pressures of the donors in order

to create legitimacy for an outside agenda that benefits the donor countries (e. g., sale of technologies, opening up of markets, extraction of resources) or, in the case of actual protections (e. g., sustainable development, environmental and rights protections) to establish a symbolic commitment to an agenda that will never be funded with documents that are nothing more than useless pieces of paper (an exercise not in agenda setting but in agenda diverting or whitewashing). Not only do foreign consultants write these plans as “technical advisors” to (mostly unrepresentative) governments, but they assure their signing through “capacity building” funds that are usually indirect bribes to the government officials with whom they are working (see Lempert 2009, unpublished).

The purpose for almost all of these documents appears to be to create an illusion of sovereignty of weak governments that are really dependent on outside pressures, while also creating legitimacy for hidden agendas through manipulation and drama. These agendas are also used to oppose any entrance of legitimate public “development” concerns (including implementation of international law) by creating the inference that they are not on the government agenda. Meanwhile, the plans are used as agenda setting tools either to run projects over and over again, often with co-dependency on the problems and treatment only of symptoms, or, in the case of policy areas where there are weak international commitments for actual beneficial activities (e. g., sustainable development, environmental and rights protections) to simply create an advertisement for outside fundraising. The cloak of recipient government authority and the reliance of implementing organizations (international and local non-governmental organizations) on funding from the donor organizations that fund these agendas, means that these practices are rarely exposed or challenged.

While this starts at the national level in national plans from the most powerful actors and almost always with the Ministry of Planning and Investment that holds real power (usually by the World Bank funding economists to promote a foreign corporate agenda), these are usually followed by “action plans” at the level of line Ministries and/or with “civil society” organizations and structures that are funded by the donors with little local accountability as part of the earmarked influence that is euphemistically referred to as “sector wide approaches”. These sector wide approaches chop up country agendas and undermine any kind of overall sustainable development planning in ways that promote the interests of

specific international organizations and single agendas. This sector wide approach is analogous to training an athlete one limb at a time.

The result of all of this is to knowingly undermine the concept of government accountability and protection of appropriate government functions and to debase the professionalism and purpose of planning tools. It is what former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to as the use of “soft power” in U.S. intervention to promote the national interests of intervening countries. Indeed, this exercise of “soft power” is the corollary to what countries used to refer to as military or “gunboat diplomacy” or, in the words of U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt during the era of American late 19th and early 20th century imperialism, the “carrying of a big stick”. Rather than using force or the threat of force to induce compliance, countries realized that they can also purchase compliance with cash, to purchase compliance directly or indirectly, by setting agendas. In referring to the use of “aid” as a form of “soft power”, the implication is that powerful countries now promote their influence through all of the various forms by which they can transfer money, including through “aid” and agenda setting (see Nye 2004).

With the emergence of these implementation mechanisms, the agents that promote them have also created a litany of euphemistic terms to hide what is really happening. “Commitment”, for example, usually means that an agency has been found that will take funds and promote a foreign agenda or that will simply sign an agreement if that agenda is one of inaction (agenda diverting). “Action” often means the ability of foreigners to fundraise for their agenda and to pick and choose the pieces that will be implemented. “Right” is often a demand for funding for a specific interest group and policy. In other words, the agenda setting document mechanisms and proposed form of implementation are themselves the places to look to examine where and how government agendas may be manipulated by donors.

The hidden agenda of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda can also be understood in light of this critique. In many recipient countries, government officials use the authority they have in order to extract as much money as they can from donors in the form of projects that can directly benefit the officials, themselves. The more “plans” and “capacity building” and “legal frameworks” and “treaties” there are, the more funds are concentrated on government bureaucrats in the recipient countries. The idea of the Paris Declara-

tion may actually be an attempt by the donors to try to structure their influences on the recipient countries in ways that assure they can coordinate their advantages rather than compete with each other to take advantage of recipient countries. One can come to this conclusion easily by recognizing that the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda not only do not empower citizens in either the recipients or the donor countries, but they do not reference or assure compliance with international development law or professionalism.

One way to test whether the criticisms of self-interested, manipulative agenda setting, in violation of local sovereignty and international principles, holds true for specific donors, recipient countries or projects, is to simply hold the implementing activity up to the light by testing whether or not it adheres to the principles of professionalism and international laws and principles. That is simple to do using an indicator.

**5. The Indicator of “Action Planning” that Can Measure Adherence to Recognized Professional Standards of the Field**

**5.1 Scoring Matrix**

To make it easier for practitioners and the public to tell the difference between effective implementation tools for development that meet professional standards for management tools and fulfill international legal requirements and principles for interventions, it is easy to transform the principles presented above into an indicator of compliance that is presented below (see Table 1). Since the full list of 12 principles really tests compliance in two different areas: professionalism/feasibility and compliance with key international protection and development objectives, it is possible to score organizations and/or specific interventions on these two dimensions.

Even non-experts can quickly use this tool as a litmus test on competence and on compliance after reading through it and then looking at the sample scoring (of the U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions), below.

By simply asking whether a “development” organization or initiative meets the test of satisfying professional criteria (the first category) and the international community’s list of legal elements and principles for “development” (the second category) using “Yes or No” questions and then counting up the results, one can quickly score the organization or initiative on the two dimensions and then come up with an overall picture. The small matrix below, scoring the first category in rows, listed on the left (from 0 to 7 points, given the 7 principles for professionalism) and across columns (from 0 to 5 points) offers a way of translating the scores into descriptive labels of the relative compliance: Note that this two-category indicator is not an absolute scale since it is simply a monitoring and compliance tool. However, it can be used by the public, practitioners and by scholars as a measure of relative compliance of different organizations and interventions. Like most indicators, answers to each question would need to be “calibrated” to assure that different observers make the exact same determinations. To do so would require a longer manual for standardized, precise answers across observers.

**5.2 Measures/Sub-Factors**

The scoring is the same for each principle and one can refer back to the descriptions of the principles above, for reference (see Tables 2 and 3). Most of the questions are clear cut “Yes” (1 point) or “No” (0 points), but in cases where there is a judgment call, scorers can opt for a “Debatable” (0.5 points).

Table 1: Scoring Matrix

		<b>B. Compliance with Key International Protection and Development Objectives (5 points)</b>	
		<i>Weak or None (0 – 2 points)</i>	<i>Strong (2,5 – 5 points)</i>
<b>A. Administrative Feasibility/ Professionalism (7 points)</b>	<i>Strong (4.5 – 7 points)</i>	Foreign Interest Promotion (Hegemony)	Truly Actionable Development Document
	<i>Moderate (2.5 – 4 points)</i>	Intervention Not Compliant with International Law and Objectives with Weaknesses in Implementation	Development Document Compliant with International Law and Objectives with Weaknesses in Implementation
	<i>Weak or None (0 – 2 points)</i>	Harmful Propagandistic Appeal for an agenda undermining international principles	Fundraising or Symbolic Document Only, for a worthwhile agenda



Table 2: Sub-Factors A - Administrative Feasibility and Professionalism

<b>A. Administrative Feasibility and Professionalism: Does the organizational capacity, oversight, mission, clarity and accountability exist to ensure that the plans are truly actionable?</b>	
Question A.1	<i>Organizational Mission, Vision and Functions</i> (Legal Role, Authority, and Already Formulated Strategies). Does the plan or action document follow and fit within an existing organization that has the established mission (to promote and/or protect a resource or outcome), future vision, and established functions and overall strategies to which they can be held internally (and externally) accountable to implement the goals of the documents or should it better be targeted somewhere else?
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – 0
Question A.2	<i>Organizational Incentives</i> . Does the plan or action document recognize existing incentives of actors in the suggested implementing organizations and confirm that those actors have an actual incentive to carry out the components of the document and will internalize its goals, sustainably, over the long-run?
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – 0
Question A.3	<i>Capacity and Resources</i> . Does the plan or action document recognize and confirm existing resource capacities that will be realistically applied to achieve the desired outcomes?
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – 0
Question A.4	<i>Analysis of Problems and Behaviors to Be Changed</i> . Does the plan or action document address the underlying reasons why the plan is needed now and has yet to be implemented without such plan (such as previous mis-spending or planning failures), and work to shift resources and priorities that have impeded past implementation so that the intended actions will be carried out, with the specific, targeted interventions and steps to change the behaviors that are at the root cause of the problem addressed, and that can be placed within a logical framework to assure the intended actions take place?
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – 0
Question A.5	<i>Clarity of Goals, Measures and Reward Systems for Implementation and Effective Evaluation System</i> . Does the plan or action document establish clear measures of achievements for the outcomes that enable consistent monitoring and feedback, in the context of an effective independent, results-based, evaluation system and does it use specific, targeted and effective rewards and punishments to hold implementing agents accountable? (see Lempert 2009b)
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – 0
Question A.6	<i>Consistency, Integration and Prioritization of Activities</i> . Does the plan or action document integrate and prioritize activities in a way that are strategic and efficient and that cannot be manipulated by outside pressures or forces (e. g., purchase of one part of the agenda) that would distort outcomes or goals, with contingency plans and other preparations available to overcome any barriers or setbacks?
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – 0
Question A.7	<i>Accountability to Beneficiaries through Rights Based Strategies</i> . Does the plan or action document build in incentives for outcomes by creating accountability to the beneficiaries, such as through rights-based approaches that are legally enforceable?
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – 0

Table 3: Sub-Factors B - Compliance with Key International Protection Development Objectives

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**B. Compliance with Key International Protection Development Objectives: Do the activities fit within the international legal framework of development objectives including sustainable development, human and cultural "development" or long-term poverty reduction, protection of sovereignty and avoidance of dependency, protection of cultural and individual rights, and other sub-goals?**

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Question B.1	<i>Promotion of Sustainability.</i> Does the plan or action document examine cultures and countries within their eco-systems and apply the principles of sustainability (sustainable development) planning, balancing population and consumption with resources and productivity? (see Lempert/Nguyen 2008)
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – 0
Question B.2	<i>Promotion of Development or Poverty Reduction.</i> Does the plan or action document meet the goals of "development" (full expression of multiple capacities of both cultures and individuals in their diversity and within their values and choices) or true long-term poverty reduction that assures equity and addresses the real root causes of both absolute and relative poverty? (see Lempert, unpublished, unpublished)
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – (0)
Question B.3	<i>Protection of Sovereignty, Cultural Integrity, and Prevention of Dependency.</i> Does the plan or action document protect the full sovereignty of individual cultures and countries that are the targets of the interventions or does it bring outside, conflicting interests and seek to pattern systems for dependency on outside technology, capital, or other influence or homogenization, and does it reflect either an "organic" emergence of the process from the beneficiaries themselves, or from specialists seeking to re-establish a system broken by colonialism or other disruption, rather than result from outside payments and promotion of change agents to merely promote intervention? (see Lempert 2009, unpublished)
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – (0)
Question B.4	<i>Other International Treaty and Professional Compliance and Screening.</i> Does the plan or action document meet the objective professional and legal requirements for this type of intervention as would be determined through independent screening measures using established laws, principles and best practices as the standards in the areas of democratization, human rights, cultural rights balanced with individual rights, balance of male and female rights, and in ways that fit long-term universal principles for human diversity and human survival, or have these been weakened, evaded or compromised in some way?
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – (0)
Question B.5	<i>Expected Missions and Functions of the Implementing Organization Do Not Usurp Those of Other Organizations that Could Better Perform Them and Do Not Compromise the Organization's Overall Performance.</i> Does the plan or action document address the correct implementing organizations and assure that there has been screening of the organization in comparison to other organizations to assure that this organization is the right one to have the expected missions and functions, and that those expected missions and functions do not distort existing missions and functions of the implementing organization or others (such as placing a legislative/policy plan within a Ministry to bypass the legislative framework, or vice versa)?
Scoring:	Yes – 1 Debatable or not relevant – 0.5 No – (0)

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## 6. How Some Approaches Do

After understanding how the indicator works, it is generally easy to apply to every new case. It takes just a few minutes to score organizations and/or interventions on the administrative feasibility/professionalism of implementation mechanisms/documents. Though it might take slightly longer, it is also relatively easy to score organizations and/or interventions on compliance with development objectives (assuming one is familiar with international legal and professional requirements) with close agreement among anyone using it. Below is an example of how the scoring can be done using the U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery (and/or similarly, the U.N. Convention Against Corruption that has followed from it).

From the results, it is also easy to see that few, if any, organizations that claim they are following “best practices” and acting consistently with international legal requirements and professionalism in development interventions are actually doing so. This simple test exposes their claims.

Results in applying this indicator fall into the six different categories that are shown in the scoring matrix. A few typical examples are offered below for each category, starting with the three categories that are in strong compliance with key international protection and development objectives (the right hand column of the two columns in the scoring matrix and the three rows in this column) and then presenting those that are in weak compliance (the left hand column in the scoring matrix and the three rows in this column).

### 6.1 Action plans and other intervention documents that are in strong compliance with key international laws and treaties to meet rights protections and development objectives

- Truly Actionable Development Document: *The Marshall Plan under U.S. President Harry Truman and the New Deal under U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt* are examples of actionable development plans that met the international legal requirements for intervention. They are strong on development objectives of promoting poverty reduction and economic and social development though arguable on whether they promoted sustainability or cultural integrity (especially given the U.S. influence over Europe in the Marshall Plan), earning roughly 3 points on compliance. They could potentially score 7 points on professionalism (though

slightly different for individual components). These were action plans with effective results.

- Appropriate Development Document with Weaknesses in Implementation: *Green Party political agendas and some Academic and interest group development agendas* are fully consistent with the international legal requirements for development objectives but have some weaknesses in effectiveness. Many environmental platforms for sustainable community development or academic plans can score 5 points on compliance with international development objectives though some score less by not fully understanding cultural group rights and protections. However, these plans have not won support, meaning that by definition they are not actionable. They fail to change the incentives of those who need to take action and their plans only go half-way in addressing root causes and priorities; missing the need to convince those whose support they need. This means that they don't really score more than 3.5 points on their strategic thinking for real implementation.

- Fundraising or Symbolic Document Only for a worthwhile agenda: *The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; the U.N. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; and Environmental Sector or Sub-sector Action Plans of IUCN in various countries* are examples of plans that are fully consistent with international development objectives but are ineffective symbols that reflect no real resources or commitments behind them. These can earn a full 5 points on compliance with development objectives. In terms of whether they are actionable, they score only 1 point for working with the organizations with the correct mandates, but none in any other categories since they do not address incentives, root causes, resources, or accountability issues.

### 6.2 Action plans and other intervention documents that are in weak compliance with key international protection and development objectives

- Foreign Interest Promotion (Hegemony): *UN Country Development Strategies and Development Bank Country Strategies as well as many international “aid” or “development” agencies acting at various levels with “Poverty Reduction” Plans* score the same as one would score a transnational corporation that makes no pretense to having a “development” mission and simply promotes its own commercial interests. The

agenda setting documents of these organizations do not promote “sustainability” and do not meet the international community’s definitions of true poverty reduction or human development, nor do they protect sovereignty, truly protect cultures and cultural rights, or assure against distortions in the government and economic systems where they intervene. Thus, they earn 0 points for compliance and are apparently promoting a hidden agenda. However, they can be remarkably effective in promoting business agendas with governments where they intervene, earning up to 6 points in feasibility and professionalism for their non-development agendas; all but the point for accountability to beneficiaries (that ultimately leads to public backlash against hidden agendas they may be promoting with government elites). Most of these “development” or “poverty reduction” approaches are really designed to transfer technology, promote production, consumption and trade to support a globalization agenda. Note that some activities that could be appropriate might fall into this category, though it might seem shocking for them to be here. In Laos, for example, the U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has been very effective in gaining government commitment of its “Child Nutrition Action Plan”. The government effectively shifted budget resources to nutrition. To convince the government, however, the FAO allied with the World Bank to show that human productivity investments, like investments in farm animal health, would generate higher returns for the government (indirectly, through growth in Gross Domestic Product). This isn’t sustainable development or long-term poverty reduction. It is not compliant with international rights treaties or international development standards that are established as the basis for interventions with and investments in human beings (and also warn against cherry picking specific intervention areas in promoting the welfare of children rather than developing the “whole child” and fulfilling all of the rights of children to develop as full human beings), but it was effective in promoting government action.

- Inappropriate Intervention with Weaknesses in Implementation: *Foreign interventions like Public Administration and Legal/Justice Sector “Master Plans”, the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000), NGO development interventions with local governments and “participatory appraisals”* can all be examples of legally non-compliant development approaches that are also seemingly incompetent. Cynics might wish to subdivide the examples here into two categories

since there may be different factors that lead organizations or interventions to fall into this category. Some “development” organizations simply misunderstand the principles of development and of management and their shoddiness is evidenced in their implementation. Other organizations that start off understanding development may simply find themselves co-opted by their donors or by government bureaucrats or by ideologies. In other cases, it may be that international organizations use hidden agendas under the cover of development and what they do is to assure that the hidden agendas are effective but the true development goals are ineffective. For example, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) appear to give little more than lip service to certain development agendas like sustainable development (now relegated to just one of the MDGs on “environmental protection”, MDG8, that is also the one goal that the international community recognizes as an overall failure). Yet, at the same time, the MDGs appear to ensure that goals not compliant with international requirements, like short-term unsustainable productivity increases from foreign investment and public State schooling, that act to destroy cultural rights protections, are carried out effectively (see Lempert 2014a, 2014b; Lempert/Nguyen 2008, 2013). These interventions might, debatably, score 2 points on their compliance with international protection and development objectives, (.5 points on all categories but sustainability). They can score at best 3 points on feasibility (1 point for working with government, .5 points for incentives and resources given that parts of the plans will be favored while others will be discarded, and similarly .5 debatable points in analysis and goals).

- Harmful Propagandistic Appeal for an Agenda Undermining International Principles (often in the name of those principles): Handicraft, Tourism and many other Economic Sector Subsidy Projects (to promote productivity and trade), and some hypocritical treaties for “development” such as the U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions and the Conventions Against Corruption, and even the Paris Declaration and Accra Agreement are not really promoting established development objectives under international law and lack competent implementation. Not many mechanisms fall into this category because most mechanisms that fail are symbolic agendas that may be deliberately designed to fail. Often they do not meet the real agendas of donors and are diversions or “whitewash” (environmentalists

say “greenwash” and rights advocates say “rightswash”) whose proponents are weak. Meanwhile, many agenda setting mechanisms with hidden agendas are actually effective in promoting the hidden agendas under the rubric of “development”. The U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and the Conventions (see Appendix A) that have followed *score only 1 point for consistency with international law and treaty requirements for development goals, and 0.5 points in terms of action*, with the scoring shown in tables below (see Appendix B). Indeed, in the case of this example, none of the violations of law and principles by international organizations that are exposed in this article and that could be described as examples of international corruption can be stopped by this treaty. The failures exposed in this article would certainly be considered as forms of bribery, theft of assets, or abuse of authority, but the Convention Against Corruption has made a clear choice not to provide a definition that would target the wrongdoers and change the behaviors. Simply urging the passing of legislation by the very groups who are at the source of the problem suggests that agenda setting mechanisms with scores placing them in this category are at best hiding other agendas or merely offering symbolic action (“rightswash”) with no intent of addressing the underlying problems and perhaps little understanding of them. What makes the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda also fall into this category is that they reference no clear development goals and seem to hide an agenda for promoting donor coordination against the interests of beneficiaries in recipient countries. Nothing in the Paris Declaration or Accra Agenda suggest that recipient countries would have any incentive to implement it or any understanding of what they were implementing. The indicator exposes it as simply a propaganda statement that can be used by donors to try to drive out actual development activities that do not “harmonize” and “cooperate” with other, hidden agendas under the name of “development”.

## 7. Conclusion

The irony of exposing the flaws in the agenda setting and implementation mechanisms of development projects today is that this article, itself, may not really be an “action” document. It may fall into the category of strong development mechanisms but only with moderate feasibility for actual implementation.

The reality today is that “experts” who are in the position to make changes have little incentive to change, while those who are best protected by accountability

tools like this one (members of the public) are the least informed and organized about where or how to begin to push for reforms. An indicator can facilitate change, but like other tools, it must be in the hands of those willing and able to use them.

While there is a body of international law and while there are sets of professional standards, there are still few mechanisms for their enforcement. Though certain aspects of international law have been made “actionable” by the international court of justice, most have not. Similarly, while some professional organizations certify their members and require adherence to professional standards, there are very few legally enforceable professional standards at all other than in a few professions with specific and direct impact on public safety. In the area of international interventions, applications of such standards are even weaker because there are effectively no bodies to police them. Often decisions are made by small numbers of actors using and directing public money in “donor” and “recipient” countries, with little or no transparency and in many cases little or no legal standing by citizens to directly challenge interventions and to hold them accountable to international law or professionalism. In those cases where membership organizations police their own members, the incentives may be to protect the profession more than to protect the public.

In short, foxes have entered the henhouse in design and implementation of international development interventions as well as many other governmental systems. The only way that change can really occur is if those public voices who have an interest in the oversight act collectively to protect their interests.

This article offers one tool, a weapon of empowerment, to at least facilitate that effort, as part of a codification of laws and standards that could ultimately be enforceable both by those paying for the interventions and those at the receiving end. This indicator takes away excuses that oversight is too difficult for ordinary citizens and that we must simply wait, pray, and rely on experts to change in ways they have little incentive to change, rather than to take on the burdens of citizenship to protect the public interest in promoting effective, efficient and law abiding development interventions.

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Appendix A: Preliminary Information for Assessment of the United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions

**Scoring of the United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions on the 2 parts (17 questions) of the indicator:**

The stated goals of the Declaration (UN Declaration Against Corruption, 1996)	<p>This is a 10 point declaration with a 12 point annex following a Resolution in 1975 "condemning" the same practices. It builds on a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations of the UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council. Thus, this could be an actionable document based on past goals and an existing code. It:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "invites" Member States to take actions;</li> <li>- "requests" the Economic and Social Council to draft laws and "promote" the resolution;</li> <li>- "invites" other bodies to take action;</li> <li>- encourages private and public corporations and individuals to cooperate, and</li> <li>- "requests" the Secretary General of the U.N. to prepare a report on progress.</li> </ul> <p>The stated goals are claimed to be those of: "mobilization of investment, finance, technology, skills and other important resources across national borders, in order, inter alia, to promote economic and social development and environmental protection", but there is no explanation of the link between investment and any actual benefit in social or economic development or environmental protection or sustainability, nor is there an explanation of how investment policies themselves could be a form of pressure to violate international laws on cultural protections (genocide) that might themselves be a form of corruption of governments and systems.</p> <p>The document is directed only at public and private corporations but not at international development banks. It mentions "ethics" but does not define the ethics of the international system or international laws and goals that are relevant (sustainable cultures).</p> <p>The standard given is national laws of foreign countries, but these laws are also subject to manipulations by international interventions that may be supported by business and delivered through international donors and these are not addressed.</p> <p>The other stated goal is the promotion of business and the "global economy" in a way apparently designed to protect the interests of the most powerful countries competing against each other to "enhance competitiveness in international transactions".</p> <p>The Annex calls on Member States to take actions to combat "all forms of corruption, bribery and related illicit practices in international commercial transactions" but not in any other spheres. Actions by governments or multi-national banks to change domestic policies in ways that promote their self-interest and could be defined as "corruption" are not criminalized or recognized by the document.</p>
Follow up implementing activities	<p>The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2004) followed the Declaration almost a decade later, sounding like it followed similar objectives. In fact it was promoted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime rather than as part of rights protections and promotions for political equality, transparency, good governance and democracy. While some 140 countries have signed this Convention that requires them to offer paper laws in their countries, the implementing organizations remain the very bodies that sanction corruption. The treaty does nothing to go to the root causes of the problem (political inequality) and the incentives that maintain it. There are no sanctions dependent on outcomes and no public oversight other than international "reviews". The Convention is a lengthy document that appears to be little more than a "wish list" that calls for increased state powers and global linkages (that could worsen the problems it claims to solve by concentrating elite powers rather than empowering the victims in anything more than encouraging their participation and protection and defining the harms they face). There is no definition of corruption within it that would allow for any measures. The treaty protects "national sovereignty" but not the cultural groups at risk from State power. The treaty includes self-praise from then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, that it sends "a clear message that the international community is determined to prevent and control corruption" and that it reaffirms "respect for the rule of law, accountability, and transparency" though in itself it is no more than symbolism (page iv). The focus on "asset recovery" and international cooperation suggests that the real beneficiaries will be powerful organizations acting in weak countries and seeking greater freedom to impose their authority without interference from individual officials. It has been followed with requests for "capacity building".</p> <p>A coalition of NGOs has formed to represent public needs, following the Convention.</p> <p>A similar convention, the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was also passed in conjunction.</p>
Overall analysis of the Declaration as an actionable document	<p>It took 20 years to move from the stage of the Resolution to the Declaration that lacks any force of law, binding action, resources or implementation authority. Even in the small areas it covers, the groups that it tasks to be vigilant have no incentive to take action because they are promoting the businesses of their countries (powerful countries) or enhancing their individual authority (in the recipient countries).</p>

## Appendix B: Analysis of the United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions with the scoring matrix

<i>Analysis</i>		
Question	Indicator	Scoring
A.	<i>Administrative Feasibility and Professionalism</i>	Weak to non-existent. There is nothing actionable in this document at all. It is simply an invocation to governments with no attention to sources of the problem, to clear standards or behaviors. <i>0.5 points.</i>
A.1	<i>Organizational Mission, Vision and Functions (Legal Role, Authority and Already Formulated Strategies)?</i>	Debatable. The U.N. is the right organization to seek to protect the world's resources and peoples and to deal with cross border relations. The noting of Member States taking responsibility to develop and enforce laws to protect their peoples and resources and for appropriate efficient trade is also correct. However, the Declaration is not complete without real promotion of the organizations that can assure accountability here such as court systems at the national and international level and civil society investigations. Not mentioning these relevant organizations undercuts the possibility of solution. <i>0.5 points.</i>
A.2	<i>Organizational Incentives exist?</i>	No. The roots of corruption in the international system are those of weak governments promoting corporate interests and individuals securing their power as well as international organizations refusing to stand up to protect resources and peoples who are harmed by corruption. <i>0 points.</i>
A.3	<i>Capacity and Resources exist?</i>	No. The constituencies that want to address corruption currently lack resources and this Declaration does not find any way to provide them with those resources. <i>0 points.</i>
A.4	<i>Analysis of Problems and Behaviors to be Changed?</i>	No. Nothing has happened over 20 years and this Declaration simply restates the previous resolution without any analysis of what was needed to make the previous resolution actionable. <i>0 points.</i>
A.5	<i>Clarity of Goals, Measures and reward Systems for Implementation and Effective Evaluation Systems?</i>	No. Although the Declaration references codes of conduct, it creates no whistleblower protections or rewards, oversight mechanisms, standards or incentives to promote implementation. It simply refers to unspecified "laws" and "ethics". <i>0 points.</i>
A.6	<i>Consistency, Integration and Prioritization of Activities?</i>	No. There are no priorities here and the actual goals of the document are contradictory. Is the goal only to benefit foreign investors in globalization or to bring any real benefits to the countries where investments are made? <i>0 points.</i>
A.7	<i>Accountability to Beneficiaries through Rights Based Strategies?</i>	No. The only actors mentioned here are governments. The lack of government accountability, which is the real source of more forms of corruption than this Declaration addresses, are not even considered in the Declaration. <i>0 points.</i>
B.	<i>Compliance with Key International Protection and Development Objectives:</i>	Weak to non-existent. In the name of anti-corruption, the document seems to have hijacked the international agenda and replaced it with globalization to protect corporate interests of the major powers. <i>1 point.</i>
B.1	<i>Promotion of Sustainable Development?</i>	No. The Declaration mentions environmental protection but its real goal is to promote the "globalized international economy" which is a path that undermines sustainable development of diverse cultures in their resource bases. <i>0 points.</i>



B.2	<i>Promotion of Development or Poverty Reduction?</i>	No. Though the Declaration claims to promote economic and social development, that appears to be just a euphemism here for foreign investment and cultural destruction that will have no real impact on relative or absolute poverty reduction over the long-term or on promoting the diversity that is the key goal of development. <i>0 points.</i>
B.3	<i>Protection of Sovereignty, Cultural Integrity and Prevention of Dependency?</i>	Debatable. The Declaration does not impose any foreign laws or requirements on any systems and recognizes local sovereignty of laws which is part of its weakness in being actionable. Yet, at the same time, it offers no cultural protections and has the main purpose of promoting the interests of foreign investors coming from powerful countries, and furthering globalization. <i>0.5 points.</i>
B.4	<i>Other International Treaty and Professional Compliance and Screening?</i>	No. By not referencing key international documents that protect cultures and individuals against the harms of globalization and those caused by international donor and multi-lateral bank interventions, the Declaration seems to open the way for exploitation in the name of addressing corruption. <i>0 points.</i>
B.5	<i>Expected Missions and Function of the Implementing Organization Do Not Usurp Those of Other Organizations that Could Better Perform Them and Do Not Compromise the Organization's Overall Performance?</i>	Debatable. There is no attempt here to legislate policy in ways that would undermine established government functions but the lack of mention of the role of civil society and of courts in achieving the real impact against corruption may weaken the ability of those organizations to perform their role in this area. The promotion of objectives of trade through dubious arguments that it benefits the environment and social development may be part of undermining government protections and sovereignty. <i>0.5 points.</i>
Total:	The Declaration violates the objectives of the international system and instead promotes elite business interests, but it is also inactionable. It is nothing more than symbolism that will have zero impact. This is a classic case of the "treaty business" of the U.N. and of the degradation of the international system. Not only are the real objectives of the U.N. system for protection of global peace and security through cultural protections and sustainability being undermined here by elites promoting globalization and business interests in the name of addressing a recognized harm of "corruption", but it is done in a way that reveals the powerlessness of the U.N. system.	

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